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From Medina to Runnymede: 
Comparing the Foundational Legacies 
of the Constitution of Medina and the 
Magna Carta 
JEREMY KLEIDOSTY 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT Identifying an Islamic constitutional tradition can be controversial due to 
orthodox Muslim understandings of God’s sovereignty and agency. Further complicating 
such discussions are arguments surrounding the compatibility of Muslim traditions with 
international norms alternately referred to as ‘Western’ or ‘universal’, depending upon one’s 
political preferences. This comparative examination of Muhammad’s ‘Constitution of 
Medina’ and the Magna Carta argues that where there is assent and accountability, there is 
also agency. Just as the relatively spare discussion of rights in the Magna Carta laid the 
foundations of what would become a far more expansive constitutional tradition in the West, 
the very existence of Muhammad’s covenant along with the fact that this covenant details 
specific tribal duties with corresponding rights to societal goods and a vision of the rule of 
law, indicates that Islamic states can indeed codify and negotiate the challenges of 
governing, even within the framework of a transcendent law (sharīʿa). Assessing the unique 
constitutional characteristics of the ‘Constitution of Medina’ and the Magna Carta will 
reveal that each of these documents, while not properly constitutions, are concerned with 
fundamental constitutional issues that have surprising resonance in the aftermath of the Arab 
Revolutions of 2011 and in other redistributions of international power. 
 
 
 
If the Magna Carta is constitutive of the Anglo-American legal tradition – and, after all nearly a 
thousand federal and state courts in the United States have cited the Magna Carta in formal 
decisions, and, in the half-century between 1940 and 1990, the Supreme Court cited the text in 
over 60 cases – it is at the same time indebted to Roman, Saxon, Norman, and Church (canon) 
laws, customs, and practices.
1
 
Surely the Constitution of Medina provides valuable information on the founding of the 
Ummah and its nature. There is nothing in the document concerning the Ummah which 
contradicts what the Qurʾan says. The two sources are mutually confirmatory in many respects, 
and they supplement each other. The Constitution spells out in greater detail than the Qurʾan 
the political structure of the Medinan community and the agreed upon military aspects of life, 
such as ‗neighbourly protection‘, blood-wit, alliances, clients, and so on. The religious nature of 
the Ummah is, of course, to be learned above all from the Qurʾan, but the practical detail 
needed for a fuller picture must come from other contemporary documents.
2
 
                                                 
1
 Kent Worcester, ‗The Meaning and Legacy of the Magna Carta‘, PS: Political Science & Politics 43, no. 03 
(2010), p. 452. 
2
 Frederick Denny, ‗Ummah in the Constitution of Medina‘, Journal of Near Eastern Studies 36, no. 01 (1977), 
pp. 39-47. 
New Middle Eastern Studies 1 (2011) 
2 
 
As the quotes above illustrate, both the Magna Carta and the Constitution of Medina are 
formative documents in their respective legal/constitutional traditions. A vast amount of 
scholarship has been produced concerning the Magna Carta in particular, and the literature 
regarding the Constitution of Medina is also becoming more expansive. Surprisingly, little to 
no work has been undertaken to understand the actual roots of these disparate constitutional 
narratives and traditions, and to compare them in such a way that their commonalities and 
distinctive elements can be usefully employed. As the continuing protests and political 
upheaval throughout the Muslim world show, the conventional wisdom which portrays 
Muslims as politically complacent or as opposed to ‗Western‘ constitutional norms is now 
largely discredited. If these events and, more importantly, their potential ramifications, are to 
be understood, then it is essential that more work is done in understanding how these 
traditions may act and interact in a world that is highly interdependent and in which cultural 
and historical influences are subject to constant renegotiation. 
In order to appreciate the Islamic constitutional tradition, it is helpful to consider the 
foundations upon which the constitutional frameworks of Western and Islamic governance 
have developed. The story of European forms of constitutionalism begins, in a philosophical 
sense, in classical Athens. From a practical perspective, however, the constitutional norms 
still in operation are largely considered to date back to one very particular time and 
document: the Magna Carta promulgated by King John of England in 1215. This is one of the 
oldest documents which still has force of law under some of its provisions and it explicitly 
influenced many subsequent constitutional regimes in a variety of Western contexts. 
Although its immediate impact was minimal, the legendary legal status and legitimacy it 
attained can be traced as follows: 
In 1225, the court of King Henry III prepared yet another version of the document, which the 
king stamped with his seal ‗in return for a grant of taxation from his subjects sufficient to pay 
for war in both France and England‘ (Vincent 2007, 19). Within a few decades, it became 
‗virtually inconceivable that Henry III or his successors could in any way seek to annul Magna 
Carta‘ (Vincent 2007, 20). The 1225 version was transcribed onto England‘s first statute roll at 
the end of the thirteenth century, under the aegis of Henry‘s formidable heir, Edward I (see 
Carpenter 2003 and Morris 2009). By the middle of the following century, officers of the state 
were legally required to pledge to observe the terms of the charter. Three of its clauses remain 
statutory law in England and Wales.
3
 
Although there are vast quantities of scholarship that dispute the relevance, intentions, and 
implications of the various provisions of the charter, the position taken in the context of this 
article is one which acknowledges that ‗the significance of Magna Carta lay not only in what 
it actually said, but perhaps to an even greater extent, in what later generations claimed and 
believed it had said.‘4 Whatever the limited initial intentions of its authors were, the popular 
and political impact that Magna Carta retains is undeniable. As Tom Bingham notes in his 
history of the rule of law, ‗The myth proved a rallying point for centuries to come… more 
than 900 federal and state courts in the United States had cited the Magna Carta… between 
1940 and 1990, the Supreme Court had done so in more than 60 cases.‘5 Thus, despite the 
fact that the secular republican United States explicitly rejected British sovereignty in its 
founding, an ancient charter of an ecclesiastical and monarchical England continues to 
                                                 
3
 Worcester, ‗Magna Carta‘, p. 452. 
4
 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (London; New York: Allen Lane, 2010), p. 12. This same type of principle is 
behind debates about the importance and relevance of the ‗original intent‘ of the authors of the United States 
Constitution. 
5
 Ibid., p.13. 
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exercise a powerful hold on legal discourse and popular imagination beyond the shores of 
United Kingdom.
6
 
Likewise, there is little debate that Islamic civilisation came into being under the 
inspiration and instigation of the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad. His first foray into 
government dates back to the very early days of his prophetic career, after the migration 
(hijra) to Medina in 622 CE.
7
 So fundamental is this event, that it marks the beginning of the 
Islamic calendar system, which demonstrates the utter centrality of the relationship of faith 
and governance in Islam. It is only once a polity is established, that the faith group following 
Muhammad‘s revelation is truly seen as established in history. Although the Qurʾan gives 
few details of Prophet‘s life, the reporting of Ibn Ishaq in his Life of Muhammad is generally 
taken to be the most authentic account in existence.
8
 If this is the case, then this written 
covenant between Muhammad and his followers, including those who were not Muslims, 
provides the possibility of examining the principles which formed the core of Islamic 
government at its conception and which, given the status of Muhammad as exemplar for 
present-day Muslims, arguably establishes a legitimate basis for an authentically Islamic 
constitutional paradigm. 
The idea of an Islamic constitutional tradition can be problematic in light of orthodox 
Muslim understandings of the utter sovereignty and agency of God over the entire world, 
governments and governed alike. Leaving the nature and extent of God‘s sovereignty to the 
theologians, this examination of Muhammad‘s covenant with the residents of Medina is one 
which argues that where there is assent and accountability, there is, at least in a practical 
sense, agency. The very existence of this agreement and the details contained therein (it lays 
out, for example, explicit expectations of the duties of various tribes and their rights to the 
benefits of society, and a vision of the rule of law) indicates that practicing Muslims and non-
Muslims in Islamic states have codified and negotiated the various challenges of government 
from the earliest days of Islam, albeit within the framework of a transcendent law (sharīʿa). 
Although some scholars might be reticent to claim that this document established a 
constitutional tradition, it is nonetheless accepted that day to day questions of governing 
require additional statutes to be passed. It is on this basis that the various schools of Islamic 
law developed their fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and it is this understanding of law which 
allowed Muslim rulers to ‗implement sharīʿa‘ through promulgating the necessary qānūn 
(statute) or using siyāsa (statecraft or management).9 
Assessing the unique constitutional characteristics of Muhammad‘s covenant with the 
people of Medina alongside King John‘s concessions to the English nobles will reveal that 
each of these documents, while not properly constitutions, do concern themselves with 
particular duties and rights and define their respective polities (umma) in sometimes 
surprisingly contemporary ways.
10
 Thus the texts in question are being analysed in terms of 
the political ideas and theories that inform them, and which have been subsequently shaped 
by them. This article will begin with a comparative analysis of the following constitutional 
                                                 
6
 This is particularly ironic in light of Kent Worcester‘s recent introduction to a symposium on the legacy of 
Magna Carta (2010) in which he notes that ‗Strictly speaking, the original charter was valid only for a few 
weeks.‘ 
7
 See Montgomery Watt‘s discussion of the controversy surrounding the date and unity of the ‗Constitution of 
Medina‘, in his Muhammad at Medina (Karachi; New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 225-8. 
8
 Denny, ‗Ummah‘, p. 39. 
9
 See P.J. Vatikiotis, Islam and the State (London; New York: Croom Helm, 1987), pp.38-39. See also The 
Encyclopedia of Islam for detailed discussions of various words associated with law and legal questions in 
Islam. 
10
 W. Montgomery Watt, Medina, p. 228. It is important to state that this is not a historical exercise. In the case 
of the Constitution of Medina it is nearly impossible to confidently make historically-based arguments, as there 
is little agreement as to exactly when it was written, and even as to its documentary origins. 
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values present in the two documents in question: the definition and derivation of legitimacy, 
the definition of the subject, and the codification of rights and duties. From this initial 
comparison it may be possible to set the stage to identify future avenues of discourse for 
scholars of constitutionalism and government more generally, including Western and Islamic 
views of the rule of law, the character of government and governed, and the role that religion 
can, does, or should play within the apparatus of the state. 
The Origins and Lawfulness of the Constitution of Medina and Magna Carta 
Before analysing the texts themselves it is important to understand the contexts in which they 
were created and the ways in which they derived their legitimacy. As it is older and more 
difficult to establish in a clear context, the Constitution of Medina will be examined first. 
This document, or possibly amalgamation of documents, which is recorded in Ibn Ishaq‘s 
Life of Muhammad, serves as the earliest known model of Islamic government.
11
 More 
importantly, it originates from the time when Muhammad himself was leader of both the 
Muslim and non-Muslim communities of Medina, which makes this text an obvious potential 
exemplar for those wishing to govern in an Islamic fashion. It also accounts for the possibility 
of an Islamic pluralism that allows for peaceful religious coexistence within a Muslim state. 
Due to its longstanding existence as a document independent of the Quran and hadith, yet 
one which nonetheless is compatible with them, the Constitution of Medina can potentially 
serve as an exemplary and foundational constitutional text for even those Muslims for whom 
their religious identity is more cultural and historical. It can accommodate a wide variety of 
interpretations as to the composition of the umma, the rights and duties of the ruler and ruled, 
and the fundamental role of the state. In other words, just as the Magna Carta serves a 
mythical role in Western jurisprudence that far outstrips the particularities of its provisions, 
so too might the Constitution of Medina provide a model of basic societal values, customs, 
and institutions for Muslim societies. 
One important caveat about the Constitution of Medina must be made before further 
discussion of its features. The works of Uri Rubin and R.B. Serjeant show that to call it a 
constitution at all is simply a convenience rather than an accurate descriptor. Furthermore, 
there is debate amongst scholars as to whether the ‗Constitution‘ was written as a unitary 
document. Documentary evidence supports the contention that it was largely written in the 
period just after the hijra, when Muhammad became judge and arbiter of Medina. 
Furthermore, much of the text finds echoes in the Qurʾan itself, with many passages being 
nearly identical. However, one of the leading scholars of this document, R.B. Serjeant, has 
made the following claims about its authenticity: 
The eight documents of which it is formed are doubtless traditional in pattern and diction, not at 
all novel to the age, and comprise the following distinct elements. 
A. The confederation treaty  
B. Supplement to confederation treaty A (These two pacts A and B are to be considered as al-
Sunnat al-Jdmi‗ah cited in the arbitration treaty between ‗Alli [sic] and Mu‘awiyah.) 
C. Treaty defining the status of the Jewish tribes in the confederation 
D. Supplement to the treaty (C) defining the status of the Jewish tribes 
E. Reaffirmation of the status of the Jews 
F. Proclamation of Yathrib a sacred enclave (haram) 
                                                 
11
 Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, Ibn Hisham, Abd al-Malik and Alfred Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad (London; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1955). 
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G. Treaty concluded prior to Khandaq among the Arabs of Yathrib and with the Jewish 
Qurayzah, to defend it from Quraysh of Mecca and their allies 
H. Codicil to the proclamation of Yathrib a sacred enclave (haram) 
The two early versions of the text at present known to me are that of Ibn Ishaq which is the 
basis of the version given below, and that of Ab-i ‗Ubayd which is defective. The late copy of 
Isma‗il b. Muhammad Ibn Kathir has also been consulted. Ibn Ishaq‘s text… looks substantially 
reliable and correct…12 
Though some scholars have disputed Serjeant‘s findings,13 the fact that the document is 
comprised of these complementary and contemporaneous elements, whether or not it is a 
unitary work, means that the discussion that follows will look at it as presented by Ibn Ishaq 
in the singular form which it ultimately came to possess. 
The Medinan period occurred after intense persecution of Muhammad and his followers 
in Mecca which forced them to uproot and settle elsewhere. Having heard of his gift of 
prophecy, he was invited to Medina to act as a judge ( ākim) to mediate disputes between the 
various clans and clan chiefs.
14
 In Western terms, Muhammad was primus inter pares (first 
amongst equals) and the intent of the invitation did not include changing the status quo of 
power relationships within Medina beyond recognising him as a prophet able to give rulings 
on behalf of God.
15
 
In much the same way that the Roman Republic gradually ceded its authority quite 
willingly to the able and magnetic Caesar, so the Arab tribes of Medina, and eventually of the 
whole Arabian Peninsula, accepted the rule of a conscientious, able, and charismatic Prophet. 
What makes the Constitution of Medina so interesting to study is that it originated in a period 
where the political authority of Muhammad was relatively weak. It also begs the question that 
if Muhammad made this covenant at such an early stage in his career, was it the ‗constitution‘ 
itself that was the foundation of what has become the political-religious structure of Islam? 
To begin with, Ibn Ishaq simply relates that ‗The apostle wrote a document concerning 
the emigrants and the helpers in which he made a friendly agreement with the Jews and 
established them in their religion and their property, and stated the reciprocal obligations.‘16 
This seems an odd introduction for something that is often referred to as a type of 
constitution. In the first place, it only mentions an agreement between the ‗emigrants and the 
helpers‘ and the Jews, rather than with the people of Medina, as one might expect. It clearly 
delineates a separate identity between the Muslims and the Jews rather than a unified 
populace. What one may assume is that this served the purposes of Ishaq‘s narrative in 
explaining the eventual falling out between Muhammad and the Jews, an assumption 
bolstered by the fact that Muhammad himself went on to contradict this division when he 
asserted that various groups of Jews are ‗one community with the believers‘.17 The precise 
nature of the community aside, the authority by which Muhammad propagated this covenant 
with the various Medinan communities is one which was based primarily on secular and pre-
                                                 
12
 R.B. Serjeant, ‗The ―Sunnah Jāmiʿah‖, Pacts with the Yaṯẖrib Jews, and The ―Taḥrīm‖ Of Yaṯẖrib: Analysis 
and Translation of the Documents Comprised in the So-Called ―Constitution of Medina‖‘, Bulletin of the School 
of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 41, no. 1 (1978), p. 9. See particularly, pages 5-10. 
13
 For example, Michael Lecker contends that Serjeant‘s argument is unconvincing as it is based on 
‗ethnological data relating to contemporary Yemen, in addition to comparative evidence from the primary 
sources.‘ See Michael Lecker, The ‘Constitution of Medina’- Muhammad’s First Legal Document, (Princeton: 
The Darwin Press, 2004), pp. 3-4. 
14
 Jonathan Porter Berkey, The Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the near East, 600-1800, Themes in 
Islamic History Vol. 2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 68. 
15
 W. Montgomery Watt. Muhammad at Mecca (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), p. 238. 
16
 Ishaq, Life of Muhammad, p. 231. 
17
 Ibid., p. 233. 
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Muslim customs that were later imbued with religious meaning. The existence of clan and 
tribal chiefs who acted as community judges was nothing new, nor was the recognition of 
someone as having the gift of prophecy or the ability to transmit revelations from God. The 
innovative part of the equation occurred in the exclusivity of Muhammad‘s message. He 
alone was the current Prophet and his God alone was God. At first glance this would seem to 
primarily create division. In fact it was instead a mechanism through which the old divisions 
created by the worship of different deities could be overwritten and subsumed under a 
universal and inspirational calling to serve the one God of all people. This led Muhammad to 
create a new umma (literally ‗people‘) that was comprised not of blood ties but of spiritual 
brotherhood. Along these lines, Frederick Denny notes the following in his article ‗Ummah in 
the Constitution of Medina‘: 
The ummah of the Constitution is made up of believers and Muslims, and quite possibly Jews 
as well (although they may constitute a separate ummah ‗alongside‘). All the kinship groups 
mentioned are subsumed under this ummah idea, a very significant fact. But why are the 
believers distinguished from the Muslims? ... It is probable that muʾminūn throughout the 
document means just what it means in the Qurʾan: ‗believers‘. … This preponderance of 
muʾmin may indicate an early date for much of the Constitution, before muslim was used as the 
name for the followers of Muhammad, or at least before it gained a clear technical sense limited 
to the followers of Muhammad. Of course, it had a deep religious sense before the time of the 
Constitution, describing the human approach to God pre-scribed in the Revelation.
18
 
The umma, then, constituted another layer of identity that contained many of the same 
tribal obligations and expectations that existed previously, except that these obligations now 
moved beyond the realm of the tribe and acquired a potentially universal scope. It is 
particularly interesting to see that the term Muslim was not exclusively used for those who 
accepted Muhammad as prophet, but rather included all those who submitted to God in the 
way his and earlier prophetic traditions required. Rather than being the exclusive provenance 
of committed followers of Muhammad then, the community at Medina and subsequent 
Islamic regimes (including that of the religiously tolerant and pluralistic Mughals on the 
Indian sub-continent) can be legitimately described as belonging to all who show submission 
to God. This, again, is a potentially universal ideal, depending upon how submission is 
defined. 
Ultimately, the authority which undergirds the Constitution of Medina is 
simultaneously spiritual and secular, traditional and radical. Muhammad‘s genius is clear in 
the way he transformed his role as God‘s vessel and voice into judge, apostle, general, and 
exemplar of the faith. He could have, like the Christian Apostle Paul, de-emphasised 
temporal identities in order to place the focus solely on one‘s spiritual identity.19 Instead, 
Muhammad was happy to keep the existing social order intact as it provided him with 
opportunities for mass conversions by entire tribes, an infrastructure that managed law and 
order within smaller more manageable groups, and a steady stream of soldiers who could 
assist him in defence and in his conquest of the Arabian Peninsula. The unity advocated by 
Muhammad included believers in various faiths, but this did not negate their previous social 
relationships. Indeed, as stated in the Qurʾan, those ‗that have kinship by blood are closer to 
one another in the Book of God than the believers who are not kindred.‘20 
Thus, it is unsurprising that he opens his contract with the people of Medina by saying, 
‗This is a document from Muhammad the prophet governing the relations between the 
                                                 
18
 Denny, ‗Ummah‘, p. 43. 
19 
See for example Galatians 3:28, where Paul says ‗There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor 
female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus‘ (NIV). 
20 Qurʾan 33:6, cited in Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2001), p.11. 
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believers and Muslims of Quraysh and Yathrib, and those who followed them and joined 
them and laboured with them.‘21 He goes on to acknowledge Jews as belonging to groups like 
Banu al-Najjar and al-Harith. Amongst Muslims, he specifies the Banu ʿAwf, the Quraysh 
and others. The invitation to arbitrate disputes between these tribes was precisely the opening 
in the tribal power structure that would allow Muhammad and his message to become its 
centre. If God spoke through Muhammad, then who could disobey his revelation requiring all 
disputes between the tribes to be referred to God, and consequently to Muhammad?
22
 This 
revelation is then codified in the Constitution of Medina when Muhammad explicitly states to 
all the Medinans, Muslim or not, that ‗Whenever you differ about a matter it must be referred 
to God and to Muhammad.‘23 The authority of the state thus rests on its adherence to the 
message and example of Muhammad which is a direct revelation of the very word and will of 
God himself. A citizen could conceivably accept and follow this human example, even if he 
or she did not share his beliefs in whole or part. 
Perhaps because it was necessitated in part by a religious dispute and a resulting crisis 
that at one point led to King John‘s temporary excommunication, the Magna Carta opens not 
by combining spiritual and secular offices, but by reaffirming the Christian tradition of 
assigning each power to its own unique sphere. The goals of the Magna Carta were to allow 
King John to reconcile with the lords and barons who had been in revolt against his ruinous 
abuse of feudal taxation and land use privileges. At the same time, the document reaffirmed 
the independence of the church from the Crown and publicly affirmed the King‘s acceptance 
of the Vatican‘s choice for Archbishop of Canterbury.24 The essential and often overlooked 
function of the Magna Carta as a document which guaranteed the independence of the church 
is, according to political theorist Cary Nederman, that individual freedom is not 
…the only way in which the language of liberty is employed in the Magna Carta. In both the 
first and the final articles of the charter—and at several places in between—the text refers to 
another sort of liberty: the liberty of the Church. Indeed, Article 1 begins with King John‘s 
declaration that he has ‗in the first place granted to God and by this our present Charter 
confirmed, for us and our heirs in perpetuity, that the English church is to be free (Anglicana 
ecclesiastica libera sit), and shall have its rights undiminished and its liberties unimpaired.‘25 
The very idea that the Church and the State could inhabit different spheres is clearly one 
which is in stark contrast to traditional Islamic notions of the State, which conceive of State 
and Religion as conjoined twins that are utterly inseparable. There is however, a 
commonality in the concern that secular power not be allowed to infringe upon the higher 
prerogatives of religious authority. Indeed, it could even be argued that the Medieval Church, 
in some respects, aspired to exactly the same type of political-religious fusion of power and 
universal domination that traditional views of proper Islamic governance espouse.
26
 
King John‘s (1215) opening statement gives a clear indication of the authority on which 
its legitimacy rests: ‗JOHN, by the grace of God King of England, Lord of Ireland, Duke of 
Normandy and Aquitaine, and Count of Anjou…‘. God‘s grace is superficially acknowledged 
before the King‘s titles and the power they reveal over various lands are placed on display. 
                                                 
21 
Ishaq, Life of Muhammad, pp. 231-2. 
22 
Watt, Muhammad at Medina, p. 230. 
23 
Ishaq, Life of Muhammad, p. 232. 
24
 See the excellent overview of the historical context of Magna Carta at the website of the British Library 
(http://www.bl.uk/treasures/magnacarta/index.html). 
25
 Cary J. Nederman, ‗The Liberty of the Church and the Road to Runnymede: John of Salisbury and the 
Intellectual Foundations of the Magna Carta‘, PS: Political Science & Politics 43, no. 03 (2010), p. 457. 
26
 A classic example of a Muslim juristic view of the state can be seen in Mawardi‘s The Ordinances of 
Government. Likewise, the Catholic Church is replete with examples of popes who exercised substantial 
temporal power, for instance Julius the ‗Warrior Pope‘. 
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He is King, Lord, Duke, and Count (at least in name) over a sizeable kingdom. These titles 
are not those of prophet, priest, or judge, but of raw earthly power and each of them denote 
his status at the top of the feudal pecking order. Perhaps because the text to follow was really 
a series of compromises and capitulations to the Church on one hand (the King had 
recognised the Pope as overlord in a successful bid to gain church support for his rule) and 
the barons on the other, King John felt it necessary to begin the document with a show of 
strength. This show is short-lived however, for in the very next paragraph he acknowledges 
that the terms were largely dictated to him by the ‗advice‘ of ‗our reverend fathers Stephen, 
archbishop of Canterbury, primate of all England, and cardinal of the holy Roman Church, 
Henry archbishop of Dublin ... [various other bishops] … Master Pandulf subdeacon and 
member of the papal household, Brother Aymeric master of the knighthood of the Temple in 
England, William Marshal earl of Pembroke, William earl of Salisbury ... [and several other 
lords and barons] … and other loyal subjects.‘ One can only imagine how much pride he had 
to swallow to call rebellious lords his ‗loyal subjects‘.27 
Clause 1 of the Magna Carta is one of the few parts of the document that still retains 
legal force; it serves to reinforce the King‘s role as sovereign in ordering his kingdom but at 
the same time contains the strong assertions of the rights of the Church and of all ‗free men‘. 
In it, John says that ‗We have granted to God… that the English Church shall be free, and 
that it shall have its rights undiminished, and its liberties unimpaired.‘ Even though the whole 
clause is an affirmation of rights that the King cannot transgress, he claims that it is he, King 
John who ‗has granted to God‘ that these rights will be respected. This could be because even 
though Christian doctrine does not make claims to temporal authority or have an explicit 
legal or political programme, it does assert that ‗there is no authority except that which God 
has established.‘28 Indeed, the Church of the Middle Ages was both political and powerful 
and was content to flex its might through the muscle of whatever local king was in authority. 
The monarchs themselves rarely resisted because their faith taught them that the Church held 
the one and only key to the salvation of their souls. What ultimately sets the legitimacy of the 
Magna Carta apart from the Constitution of Medina is that the religious power undergirding 
the document is willingly subverted to the secular legal power even while it is simultaneously 
the implicit force behind the King‘s authority and arbiter of his eternal destiny. 
Of course, constitutional documents are never merely statements of authority or 
legitimacy. They are traditionally conceived as social contracts between both ruler and ruled 
or the government and the governed. In order to assess the legacies of these foundational texts 
it is therefore vital that one ascertain exactly which groups in society are being addressed. 
Who are the subjects or citizens who will be bound by the constitution? 
Defining the Subject: The Object(s) of Authority in the Constitution and Magna Carta 
As alluded to earlier, the Constitution of Medina is a document that subverts, elevates, and 
recreates tribal identities and obligations by placing them largely intact under a new umbrella 
identity. Uri Rubin argues that ‗the name of the new unity declared by the ―Constitution‖ is 
―umma‖. Western scholars… were aware of the fact that it must be examined according to its 
meaning in the Qurʾan, where, in most relevant cases, it has a pure religious connotation.‘29 
Rubin goes on to point out that in the opening of the Constitution it states that ‗They are one 
umma to the exclusion of all men‘, which in its original form joins umma with wa ida. In all 
                                                 
27 
King John, 1215. Magna Carta (Preamble). British Library Treasures Online, [Online], Available at: 
http://www.bl.uk/treasures/magnacarta/index.html [accessed 17 August 2009]. 
28 
See Romans 13:1. 
29 Uri Rubin, ‗The ―Constitution of Medina‖: Some Notes‘, Studia Islamica, no. 62 (1985), p. 12. 
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nine instances where the phrase umma wa ida, or singular people, occurs in the Qurʾan it 
always ‗denotes people united by a common religious orientation.‘ In other words, the 
Muslims and the Jews of Medina comprise a unified body that shares the same religion in 
distinction to those who practise other faiths.
30
 So, in the first instance, the people with whom 
Muhammad makes his covenant are qualified for ‗citizenship‘ based upon their faith.31 
Lest one doubt the inclusion of the Jews, he continues by saying ‗To the Jew who 
follows us belong help and equality. He shall not be wronged… The peace of the believers is 
indivisible.‘32 Those who are not of the monotheistic Abrahamic faiths are not included in the 
social contract and regardless of their tribal ties to those within Mecca exist definitively 
outside of the protection of the community at large. Muhammad could not be any clearer on 
this point when he writes that ‗Believers are friends one to the other to the exclusion of 
outsiders.‘33 
In addition to being a community or umma based upon faith, Medina was also a polity 
based upon the establishment of sacred territory, or haram. This sentiment is echoed by 
Hobbes and others who locate the basis of obligation between a citizen and the state in the 
state‘s role in protecting and preserving the lives of its citizens.34 Thus Rubin notes that some 
traditions hold that Muhammad declared Medina to be sacred, therefore elevating it to the 
same religious status as Mecca, before the crucial battle against Mecca just two years after 
the Hijra. This would mean that the natives of Medina, or Yathrib, would be expected to 
protect and defend their sacred ground in the same manner that the Quraysh would protect the 
holy precincts of Mecca.
35
 This basis of community originating from a desire to band 
together for the common defence is a regular feature of constitutional documents. What is 
interesting is that Muhammad‘s declaration of haram endows it with a religious significance 
that it would not otherwise have and reasserts the centrality of religious belief and faith in the 
formation of his polity. He goes on to assert: 
The Jews must bear their expenses and the Muslims their expenses. Each must help the other 
against anyone who attacks the people of this document… The Jews must pay with the 
believers as long as war lasts. Yathrib shall be a sanctuary (haram) for the people of this 
document.
36
 
Like any other constitution then, this document creates an us and a them, allowing for the 
new umma to express itself not only by its positive affirmation of monotheism and residence 
in Medina, but also in its opposition to polytheism and its defence against outsiders and 
attackers. 
                                                 
30 
Ibid., p.13. It is unclear how the status of dhimmi, or protected peoples, applies to this passage. It could be that 
because this is prior to the definitive split between Muhammad and the Arab Jews, their monotheism and tacit 
acceptance of his leadership were enough to consider them part of the umma without additional distinction. 
Alternatively, the fact that many of the Jews were already clients of Arab tribes would make such a distinction 
redundant. 
31
 The use of umma in the sense of spiritual brotherhood being emphasised prior to political brotherhood is not 
intended to contradict claims that umma ‗is basically a political confederation‘, but rather highlights the further 
point that these confederations were ‗usually theocratic‘. See R.B. Serjeant, ‗Sunnah Jāmiʿah‘, pp. 4-5. Serjeant 
makes the further point that ‗The Jews, when Muhammad made the confederation pacts after his arrival in 
Yathrib, were included in the ummah; ―through the peace (sulh) which took place between them and the 
Muʾminiin ‗Believers‘ they became like a collective body (jamiʿah) of them, with a single word and hand‖.‘ 
32 
Ishaq, Life of Muhammad, p. 232. 
33 
Ibid., p. 232. 
34
 See Leviathan, Chapter 21, where Hobbes states: ‗The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign, is understood 
to last as long, and no longer, as the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them.‘ 
35 Rubin, ‗Notes on Constitution‘, p. 11. 
36 
Ishaq, Life of Muhammad, p. 233. 
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The emphasis on common religion and territory in the Constitution of Medina should 
not completely obscure its continued recognition of pre-existing family and tribal 
relationships, which continued to be relevant well after Islam became the established faith of 
Arabia. As mentioned previously, it consistently refers to groups based on tribal identity, 
particularly when it discusses Jewish clients of various Arab tribes.
37
 The Quraysh and 
Thaʿlaba are distinguished from other tribes. In essence, the polity Muhammad sought to 
establish could be expressed in three iterations: a tribal polity, a territorial polity, and finally 
and most importantly, a religious polity. 
Once again, the Magna Carta proves to be more monolithic in its definition of polity. 
After reaffirming the independence of the church, the rest of the document lays out the rights 
of ‗all free men‘. Left out of the protections are the peasants who had feudal bonds to their 
lords that required them to work without compensation and kept them in a state not far 
removed from slavery. The basis of the community falling under his protection as king is one 
that is purely territorial, as is made clear when ‗all free men‘ is followed by the further 
stipulation that they are ‗of my kingdom‘.38 Though ostensibly free, in essence nobody in the 
feudal framework was free of the rigid social hierarchy that extended from king to peasant 
with its corresponding set of duties and honours owed to those higher up the chain. Even the 
barons were required to provide military service or a quota of troops from their manors 
financed at their own expense upon the king‘s request. It was only under King John and his 
unprecedented abuse of this system that the lords felt the need to rebel and to assert that even 
the rights of the king himself came with their attendant duties. It is this dichotomy along with 
the fact that the Magna Carta makes law supreme over even the king that elevates it to the 
level of a constitutional document rather than simply a royal decree. 
Rights, Duties, and their Respective Parties 
The rights and duties spelled out in each of these documents range from the specific and 
time-bound to the universal and timeless. In Muhammad‘s contract there is far less emphasis 
on the duties imposed on Muhammad than on those required of the people of Medina. Instead 
the obligations listed in it are primarily those owed by one particular group to another within 
society. The duties and rights enumerated here can be split into those dealing with internal 
disputes and crimes and those dealing with external threats and war. The definition of internal 
and external is, as already discussed, both territorial and spiritual, and both requirements must 
be met for the provisions of this document to be in force. 
Internal duties include payment of blood money, avenging those wrongfully killed, 
providing hospitality, and taking unresolved disputes to Muhammad. These imply the right of 
individuals to be recompensed for damages or deaths regardless of cause, along with the 
rights of people to obtain hospitality when in need and to have access to a judge to resolve 
disputes.
39
 
In reference to outsiders, the Constitution states ‗A believer shall not slay a believer for 
the sake of an unbeliever, nor shall he aid an unbeliever against a believer‘ (a negative duty). 
No matter what tribal affinities one may have, that of belief supersedes any other. In a similar 
manner, ‗believers must avenge the blood of one another shed in the way of God‘ (a positive 
duty). This defensive obligation extends to a territorial definition when Muhammad specifies 
that the ‗contracting parties are bound to help one another against any attack on Yathrib.‘ The 
                                                 
37 Rubin, ‗Notes on Constitution‘, pp. 5-9. 
38 
Magna
 
Carta, Clause 1. 
39 
Ishaq, Life of Muhammad, pp. 232-3. 
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focus on war extends to raiding parties and offensive battles which present the opportunities 
for spoils from which ‗everyone shall have his portion from the side to which he belongs.‘40 
If this document is to be considered truly constitutional, however, it must place some 
sort of restraint upon the ruler so that the contract itself is truly binding and cannot simply be 
changed by the will of the ruler. This criterion is clearly not met in the text itself. Aside from 
requiring Muhammad to fulfil his role as judge, the only other requirement placed upon him 
is to give his permission for parties to go out to war and by inference to protect ‗the good and 
God-fearing man‘ since God is their protector and he, Muhammad, is ‗the apostle of God‘.41 
One could argue, however, that combined with Muhammad‘s example of how to rule rightly, 
there are a variety of basic restraints imposed by the very conditions of being a devout 
Muslim. 
Unfortunately for King John, he did not inspire the same level of devotion that 
Muhammad did. His tyrannical actions cost him the trust of his people and so his charter 
primarily restricts his power and obligates him to respect a wide range of rights and 
privileges, all the while gaining nothing more than a reaffirmation of long-established duties 
from his nobles. In the interest of brevity, only the clauses which remain in force will be 
discussed here. First amongst the rights specified is that of the English church to be free from 
influence by the Crown.
42
 Secondly Clause 13 states that, ‗The city of London shall enjoy all 
its ancient liberties and free customs, both by land and by water. We also will and grant that 
all other cities… shall enjoy all their liberties and free customs.‘ This can be broadly 
interpreted to support the right of localities to self-determination on local issues. It also 
affirms the legitimacy of the layers of government that exist below the level of the monarch 
or head of state. The king could have qualified this statement with the addition of a phrase 
such as, ‗so long as these liberties do not impinge upon the good of the realm‘, but he chose 
not to do so and went so far as to call these liberties ‗ancient‘, which would seem to bolster 
their legitimacy even further. 
Finally, Clause 39, which deals with the fundamental right of habeas corpus, is perhaps 
the most relevant and important of the clauses still in effect. Tom Bingham‘s book The Rule 
of Law refers to this writ as ‗the most effective remedy against executive lawlessness that the 
world has ever seen.‘43 This clause protects all free men from being ‗seized or imprisoned, or 
stripped of his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any 
other way.‘ He points out that originally, habeas corpus ad subjiciendum simply meant that a 
person in custody had to be made available to a judge.
44
 It was only later that this practice 
was used to ensure that the lawfulness of a person‘s detention was examined or, more 
generally, to protect individual liberty. However, the evolutionary process which produced 
habeas corpus as it is now conceived nonetheless is traceable to the belief that it is an 
essential precept in Magna Carta.
45
 No less a legal luminary that Sir Edward Coke, who was 
involved in the seventeenth century effort to rebuke monarchical abuses of judicial power, 
argued in favour of Parliament‘s 1628 Petition of Right on the basis that detention was 
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 Ibid., pp.232-3. 
41
 Ibid., p.233. 
42
 Magna Carta, Clause 1: ‗FIRST, THAT WE HAVE GRANTED TO GOD, and by this present charter have 
confirmed for us and our heirs in perpetuity, that the English Church shall be free, and shall have its rights 
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43
 Bingham, Rule of Law, p. 14. 
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 Literally, ‗you may have the body subject to examination‘.  
45
 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
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forbidden by the charter without ‗due process of law‘, and that the only way to ensure such 
due process was through the mechanism of the writ of habeas corpus.
46
 It also enshrines the 
institution of jury trials in that punishment may only occur ‗by the lawful judgement of his 
equals or by the law of the land.‘47 To all of these guarantees is added the extra protection of 
Clause 40 which states: ‗To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice‘, thus 
protecting the citizen and the state from the corrosive effects of corruption and indefinite 
detention without charge. The totality of these clauses provides a substantial bulwark for the 
protection of individual liberty, even if the scope of that liberty was highly restricted at its 
conception. Thus, while the attribution of habeas corpus and its related protections may not 
be due to the Magna Carta in a strictly historical sense, they are clear developments upon the 
clauses of the original document and were advocated as such by those who strengthened and 
codified these protections in subsequent generations. Here it is helpful to consider Justin 
Wert‘s concluding remarks on the myth of habeas corpus and jury trial as latent in Magna 
Carta: 
The very fact that the substantive and procedural due process rights that both the Magna Carta 
and habeas corpus have protected through the centuries have varied considerably—even in 
negative directions—is proof enough of their liberty-regarding potential. In this sense, our 
acceptance of less than accurate histories is, at the very least, testament to our normative 
preference for more capacious notions of personal rights and liberties. 
In his 1914 article critiquing Whiggish accounts of Magna Carta, Charles McIlwain came 
to the conclusion that while some modern rights, like trial by jury, were never implied in the 
document in the way that we imagine today, ‗we may still hold, as our fathers did, that the law 
of the land is there‘ (McIlwain 1914, 51). Intentional or not, then, the wisdom of the barons 
who managed to secure feudal rights at Runnymede was present in the framing of procedural 
rights—like legem terrae—that were specific enough to protect their most immediate 
substantive concerns but, fortuitously, general enough to remind us that there is still work left 
to be done.
48
 
It would seem then, that the emphasis on the rule of law as an ideal that exists above 
and apart from the head of state, becomes in Magna Carta an inherent characteristic of the 
state itself and of the nation it governs. The reciprocal duties and rights it lays out are 
important not merely because their codification is binding, but also because they define the 
scope of the state and the limits of the ruler‘s power. It is little wonder then, that despite its 
very specific context, that Magna Carta is considered the founding document for the 
establishment of individual rights as being a fundamental part of the constitutional order. 
From it, one can trace the key principles enshrined in the United States‘ Bill of Rights and its 
subsequent emulators in various states and international institutions. 
Conclusion 
When analysing the Constitution of Medina and the Magna Carta side by side, it is clear that 
they are texts which emerge from fundamentally different contexts. They are documents that 
address the particular concerns of a particular people in a particular place and time. Despite 
this, both of these documents retain a remarkable degree of relevance to present constitutional 
discourse as founding documents of Western and Islamic protections of the rights and duties 
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of individual citizens. The fact that some of the Magna Carta is still in effect in legal terms 
demonstrates its lasting impact, as does the fact it is cited in court decisions even outside the 
United Kingdom as having the power of moral and legal precedent. 
In the case of the Constitution of Medina, its enduring power mainly lies in its 
constituent parts being authored by Muhammad himself, and by Muhammad‘s role as 
Prophet/exemplar for the world‘s 1.6 billion Muslims. One can see that the symbiosis of 
religion and state power existed from the very origins of Islam, but that in its earliest form its 
definition of umma was far more inclusive and pluralistic. A fundamental lack of restraint on 
the ruler exists in the Constitution. This absence of restraint has often been cited in studies of 
Muslim polities to explain a particular type of ‗Oriental despotism.‘ However, it can be 
argued that when one combines the Constitution with Muhammad‘s example as ruler, there 
are a number of restrictions that are implicit (for instance, a Muslim ruler cannot command 
people to do something forbidden by their faith). If these strictures are disregarded, one could 
argue that the legitimacy of the regime has been lost and that a change in power is justified.
49
 
Likewise the Magna Carta highlights the tension in Christendom and its successor 
states between the need to govern using secular and even violent forms of power, while 
acting in accordance with the respect for individual rights that some would argue Christian 
teaching advocates. In neither case will one find a ready-made system of government that 
would work today, but one does find well-established, time-tested principles that have 
achieved wide acceptance and legitimacy amongst the societies they represent. By 
understanding the areas in which these civilisational foundations overlap, it may be possible 
to continue the comparison into the nature of specific constitutional ideas in a way that can 
encourage greater understanding between these two traditions as the peoples they represent 
try to negotiate the best possible common future. 
Furthermore, and more practically, the comparison of the Magna Carta and the 
Constitution of Medina is important if only for the fundamental reason that all majority 
Muslim states are part of the United Nations. This means that they are likewise signatories of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and various other international charters which 
enshrine the very same values of individual liberty, right to fair trial, recourse to habeas 
corpus and other protections that are grounded in the nature of the Magna Carta. This has 
established the Magna Carta as the cornerstone of modern law for the entire globe in the 
context of international law. As people in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya grapple with how to best 
institutionalise their values, goals and societies in new constitutional regimes, they will 
undoubtedly grapple with the dual demands of preserving the Islamic nature of their identities 
whilst simultaneously ensuring that their constitutions adhere to international law and the 
entirety of its attendant requirements. Without this type of fundamental comparison, one is 
either forced to advance the very tenuous position that each civilisation is based upon 
fundamentally different norms and values which may be irreconcilable and bound for a clash, 
or to argue that Western norms have won the ideological struggle for survival and that we 
have arrived at some kind of ‗end of history‘. 
Neither of these positions seems tenable in light of the overwhelming evidence that, 
from the very earliest times, people have borrowed ideas from one another based on a very 
practical desire to create stable governments for their respective societies. Additionally, there 
can be no ignoring the demands for Muslim states to in some way enshrine Islam in their 
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constitutions, or that these demands are being made in many cases with representative, 
accountable and responsive government as an end goal. Likewise, much more work needs to 
be done in non-Muslim states to address the need for minority groups to exercise their 
fundamental rights, which may include providing for family and private law courts that 
conform to Jewish Talmudic law or Muslim sharīʿa. Sadly, progress seems to be rather 
absent on this front as governments in both the United States and the United Kingdom have 
denied recognition or even restricted the very mention of Islamic norms in court rulings.
50
 
For better or for worse, issues of religion and its role in the state seem to be wedded for the 
foreseeable future. Perhaps this discussion will provide a model of political and religious 
engagement, rather than denial, and better elucidate how they can negotiate a stable and 
harmonious marriage of the values they embrace. 
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